Sanctions
and the "Moral Case" for War
Per Oskar Klevnas
(Per
Oskar Klevnas is research officer of the Campaign Against Sanctions
on Iraq, based in Cambridge, England.)
March 4, 2003
Further Info
For background
on "smart sanctions," see Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctions
Renewed on Iraq, Middle East Report Online, May 14, 2002.
Summaries
and links to several UN agencies' planning documents are online.
A collection
of NGO assessments of the humanitarian implications of war
is available online. |
Economic sanctions
have suddenly resurfaced in the international debate about Iraq,
after months of near silence on the issue. British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, in particular, has advanced the notion that one of the
benefits of a war with Iraq would be the prospect of lifting the
punitive economic sanctions that have been in place since the end
of the Gulf war in 1991. Echoing the words of George W. Bush in
his September address to the UN General Assembly that "liberty
for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause," Blair argued
that ending Iraqis' suffering forms part of a "moral case"
for war with Iraq. Pro-war commentators in the US have begun to
attack the peace movement because the default anti-war position
-- inspections, not war -- would keep sanctions in effect indefinitely.
Anyone concerned
with the welfare of Iraqis certainly must welcome an end to 12 years
of harmful conflict fought mainly by economic warfare. But the current
debate is still plagued by the premise, which has dogged years of
tortuous wrangling over sanctions, that the international community
bears little responsibility for the plight of Iraqis. Not only do
the US and Britain continue to disavow any culpability for sanctions
in Iraq's humanitarian crisis, but they do not appear to have thought
deeply about how to ameliorate the further disruption of Iraqi lives
and livelihoods that war will bring. Bush and Blair's recourse to
moral reasoning is flawed on its face, yet in the absence of third
and fourth alternatives for "what to do" about Iraq, the
debate has ground to a halt at a humanitarian Hobson's choice between
war or sanctions.
SUFFERING AND
SELF-EXCULPATION
Blair's recent
statement to the House of Commons mentions child mortality, access
to potable water, dependence on food rations and political repression
as examples of the hardships experienced by Iraqis. The latter is
squarely the responsibility of the Iraqi regime, and its significance
for Iraqis' quality of life should not be underestimated. On the
other three issues, however, Blair's analysis is incomplete: it
is not only the level of deprivation in Iraq which is striking,
but the change that has taken place over the past 12 years. Child
(under-five) mortality has surged under sanctions. UNICEF documented
a rise from 56 deaths per 1,000 live births in the period 1984-1989
to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births in the period 1994-1999, corresponding
to 500,000 "excess deaths." The UN Security Council's
own 1999 assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq stressed
that "before 1991...90 percent of the population had access
to an abundant quantity of safe drinking water." Before 1991
average caloric intake was above 3,100 kilocalories per day, and
Iraqis enjoyed the highest rate of food availability per capita
in the region, without government food rations. All other humanitarian
indicators give a similar message: while the mismanagement of the
Iraqi economy is a long-term problem, the past 12 years have been
exceptional.
Current US
and British policy, including the "moral case" for war,
is premised on the analysis that this dramatic drop in living standards
is due to the policies of the Iraqi regime. Recent statements of
this position include a November 2002 press release by the British
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and a White House report in
January. Both of these characterize as "lies" the claim
that sanctions have caused hardship -- except for the way "Saddam
implements sanctions." In other words, the Iraqi humanitarian
crisis could have been averted had the "Oil for Food"
program in place since 1996 been implemented differently. Under
Oil for Food, Iraq can sell unlimited quantities of oil, and then
apply to the UN to use the proceeds to purchase civilian goods.
One argument
put forward by both the FCO and White House briefings is that suffering
in Iraq owes much to the Iraqi government's failure to distribute
or misuse of humanitarian supplies imported. The FCO states that
"the Iraqi regime, which seeks to portray these UN controls
[sanctions] as the cause of Iraqi suffering, has itself seriously
disrupted both the UN supplies and the source of the UN's humanitarian
funding." The White House points to claims that Iraq has been
exporting baby milk and "hoarding" medicines in warehouses.
If the regime
does indeed misuse or hoard humanitarian supplies, does this happen
on a scale that can account for the collapse in living standards
in Iraq? The evidence says no. Benon Sevan, executive director of
the UN Office of the Iraq Program, has repeatedly stated that UN
monitoring of the end use of Oil for Food imports prevents any large-scale
diversion from intended humanitarian purposes. Other UN agency reports,
including internal and confidential reports which otherwise criticize
the Iraqi government, paint similar pictures. There is no need to
invoke false notions of Iraqi government benevolence to understand
this. Among the battery of carrots and sticks used by the Iraqi
regime to control the people, its control over Oil for Food rations
is the largest carrot. Now that Oil for Food has made the regime
in effect the sole provider for the Iraqi people, it appears to
see the smooth running of Oil for Food as aligned with its own interests.
The US and
Britain further claim that Oil for Food would be adequate if not
plagued by short-term funding problems. The FCO points to the Iraqi
government's periodic cessation of oil exports, which "reduced
the humanitarian funding available [in 2002] by $1.2 billion compared
to last." While the regime undoubtedly placed political objectives
before humanitarian concerns in this instance, there is more to
the story. Another obstacle to effective implementation of Oil for
Food has been the depression of oil sales occasioned by the retroactive
pricing of Iraqi oil. This was imposed by the US and Britain in
an effort to prevent surcharges to Iraqi oil that resulted in kickbacks
to the Iraqi government. Some $30-50 million in kickbacks were indeed
prevented, by UN estimates, but at a cost of $2-3 billion to the
humanitarian program. The tradeoff between coercion and humanitarian
concerns was thereby given an unusually explicit valuation: the
Iraqi people were made to pay sixty dollars' worth of humanitarian
supplies for every dollar that the Iraqi leadership was denied.
ELIDING THE
QUESTION
Third, both
US and British officials commonly argue that the crisis in Iraq
has ensued because the wrong things are imported. The Iraqi elite
lives in luxury, while the majority starve. There certainly are
many examples of wasteful imports: recent Oil for Food distribution
plans include details of a "Project for the Construction of
an Olympic Sports City." The aforementioned FCO press release
points to "12,000 tons of mobile phones," while the White
House report mentions "an expensive gamma knife" before
repeating the obligatory denunciations of Saddam Hussein's many
"presidential palaces." Redistribution -- from elite to
poor, from mobile phones to water filters -- and a different spending
pattern could have averted the humanitarian crisis, these documents
assert.
Undoubted abuses
notwithstanding, Oil for Food is not dominated by the import of
unnecessary commodities, as the casual reader of US-British press
releases might infer. The UN World Food Program estimates that "80
percent of the average household income is constituted by the [Oil
for Food] food ration, while 60 percent of the population (around
16 million persons) rely solely on the monthly food basket to meet
all household needs," and that "[m]ilitary conflict would
have a highly disruptive impact on the implementation of the Oil
for Food Program." Oil for Food is the lifeline of ordinary
Iraqis.
Further, focusing
on distribution elides the question of why there is a need for a
ration in the first place. During 12 years of sanctions, according
to UN and OPEC figures, Iraq has generated about as much oil revenue
($63 billion) as it did in the single year of 1980 ($59 billion),
when the Iraqi population was half of what it is today. As Yale
economist William Nordhaus puts it, some $200 billion of oil revenue,
corresponding to eight years' GDP, has been lost under sanctions.
Meanwhile, Oil for Food bureaucracy, deductions for compensation
payments to victims of the 1991 Gulf war, delays in contracting
and other impediments have kept the value of goods actually arriving
under Oil for Food to a mere $25 billion over six years. This corresponds
to 50-60 cents per Iraqi per day for the past six years, and nothing
at all for six years before that. Most of this amount has necessarily
gone towards daily consumption needs, and has left little room for
investment in rebuilding infrastructure devastated by allied bombing
in 1991. The UN estimated that $29 billion of investment was required
in 1991 to restore essential civilian infrastructure to elementary
levels. Poverty, coupled with sanctions' ban on foreign investment,
leaves Iraqi sanitation systems and electrical power plants in a
lamentable state 12 years after the initial damage.
Fifty cents
a day is a starvation ration. No matter how it is distributed, it
is inadequate. Iraqi elite luxuries are distasteful next to overwhelming
deprivation, but false priorities in the implementation of Oil for
Food do not account for the level of hardship in which Iraqis find
themselves. The corruption of the Iraqi regime is no excuse for
the international community to ignore the damage caused by its attempts
to coerce the Iraqi leadership.
GRIM SCENARIOS
The refusal
of the US and British governments to recognize the impact of sanctions
has already undermined efforts to reform sanctions. "Smart
sanctions" were adopted in 2002 without any preceding assessment
of humanitarian needs, and with consequent failure to identify and
address the key constraints on economic recovery and well-being
in Iraq. Outside options were not considered, and changes were confined
to import procedures, apparently in the belief that a commodity
import program is an acceptable long-term substitute for economic
recovery.
This failure
to acknowledge the humanitarian implications of policy continues
even as war is considered. One can certainly imagine relatively
benign war scenarios, including a short war followed by the rapid
institution of a popularly legitimate and administratively effective
new regime. Such a scenario would lead to humanitarian outcomes
which rapidly would become preferable to the current harmful status
quo. But such scenarios should not be assumed. UN assessments written
for internal planning purposes, but leaked to the public, indicate
that the humanitarian risks involved are very high. One report,
produced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
estimated a "medium" scenario in which, "[i]n the
event of a crisis, 30 percent of children under five would be at
risk of death from malnutrition." Even this projected "medium"
scenario would be a disaster, replete with large refugee flows,
infrastructural decimation and consequent suspension of essential
services, an inability of the Iraqi health care system to cope with
crisis, and acute and large-scale food shortages. Other UN and NGO
studies give similar assessments, and all studies stress the highly
unusual vulnerability of the Iraqi population, whose assets and
other coping mechanisms have been decimated by years of war and
sanctions. If the Oil for Food rationing system is suspended when
hostilities break out, many Iraqi households will have no lifeline
at all once their meager stockpiles of staples run out.
When asked
about these grim scenarios, Elliot Abrams, new National Security
Council senior director for the Near East and North Africa, dismissed
UN contingency planning as "just plain speculation" and
"just pulling [numbers] out of thin air." British Secretary
of State for International Development Clare Short characterized
NGO concern about the lack of preparedness for the humanitarian
consequences of war as "grandstanding." Given the uncertainty
involved, it is clear that any estimates of consequences will have
high variance. However, this is not a reason not to evaluate the
consequences of policy, and these officials' breezy dismissal of
UN and NGO concerns does not inspire confidence.
Not only have
the US and Britain failed to acknowledge the humanitarian risks
of war, they have failed to pledge substantial resources toward
mitigating them. As one USAID official said in a press briefing:
"Nobody budgeted for an event in Iraq. We don't have a budget
for it." The US government has pledged a total of $79 million
for humanitarian supplies, and aims to feed one million Iraqis,
according to USAID. This amount is no more than what the Oil for
Food program delivers in five days, and contrasts sharply with the
UN estimates that some 16 million Iraqis are wholly dependent on
handouts. Other governments, meanwhile, have made no specific pledges.
Even before the crisis has started, this lack of commitment is harming
humanitarian efforts. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs states that "all UN agencies have been facing severe
funding constraints that are preventing them from reaching even
minimum levels of preparedness." Finally, the White House has
stated that the US is unlikely to contribute significant sums towards
the reconstruction of Iraq after a war, as "there are a variety
of means that Iraq has to be able to shoulder much of the burden
for their own reconstruction."
HUMANITARIAN
HOBSON'S CHOICE
Given the high
humanitarian costs and risks of both sanctions and war, alternative
policy options should command a strong claim to attention. Yet current
policy debate treats sanctions' continuation as given, and the British
position is that "the only alternative to disarmament by the
United Nations is that we keep sanctions in place year on year."
Insofar as the US and Britain increasingly equate disarmament with
war, the "moral case" has been constrained to options
that leave Iraqis to shoulder the entire burden of the international
community's conflict with the Iraqi leadership. Not surprisingly,
many independent arbiters of morality, including the Pope and the
Archbishop of Canterbury, have questioned Bush and Blair's attempts
to cloak the war in moral garb.
The political
ramifications of disarmament are complicated, and it is a common
observation that the Iraqi government has not been given clear incentives
to disarm. UN Security Council Resolution 687 states that the Security
Council shall consider the lifting of sanctions if Iraq is found
to have fully complied with disarmament, while Resolution 1284 stipulates
that sanctions will be suspended if Iraqi cooperates. At the same
time, three successive US administrations have firmly stated an
alternative objective, as Secretary of State Colin Powell did when,
in comments to the Financial Times, he described "sanctions
and the pressure of sanctions [as] part of a strategy of regime
change." On February 28, as Iraq began to destroy its proscribed
al-Samoud missiles, the White House reaffirmed that Iraqi disarmament
is not enough to avert war. "Regime change" has recently
slipped into British government statements as well, and Blair recently
stated that "[r]idding the world of Saddam would be an act
of humanity. It is leaving him there that is in truth inhumane."
Few would argue
that Iraqis would not be better off under a different leadership,
but "regime change" has a catch: while the Iraqi regime
could deliver disarmament, it cannot and will not deliver its own
downfall. Raad Alkadiri states a common view when he argues that
by 1997 Saddam Hussein believed "once and for all that, irrespective
of the kind sentiments of Iraq's 'friends' in the Security Council,
nothing could overturn US and British support for sanctions while
he remains in power." The obstinacy of the US and Britain,
as well as the Iraqi regime, in the political conflict over disarmament
has already inflicted tremendous suffering, through sanctions, upon
those Iraqis for whose well-being Bush and Blair now profess such
abiding concern. The apparently impending war may very well do the
same.
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