Guardian Unlimited
Login
Go to:
Guardian UnlimitedSpecial reports
Home UK Business Online World dispatch The wrap Weblog Talk Search
The Guardian World News guide Arts Special reports Columnists Audio Help Quiz

Special report Iraq

Search this site

Full coverage
Special report: Iraq

Iraq archived articles

Interactive guides on Iraq

More special reports
Britain's armed forces

The anti-war movement

Al-Qaida

United States

Iran

Israel & the Middle East

Nato

Turkey

Full index of our special reports







In this section
Sliding towards anarchy

Sunni or Shia, fault line runs between have and have nots

Rampaging mobs run amok

US marine killed by suicide bomber

This war was not worth a child's finger

Behind the lines

Inside Saddam's palace

Kurdish fighters take Kirkuk

France shows strain of anti-war stance

'April 9 will live in legend'

Charges against regime's most wanted men

Martin Woollacott: Iraq will preoccupy and pin down the US for years

Divided Arabs contemplate their second catastrophe

Boy injured by bomb to get treatment in London

Day 23 of the war



UP

Rumsfeld 'offered help to Saddam'

Declassified papers leave the White House hawk exposed over his role during the Iran-Iraq war

Julian Borger in Washington
Tuesday December 31, 2002
The Guardian


The Reagan administration and its special Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, did little to stop Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s, even though they knew Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons "almost daily" against Iran, it was reported yesterday.

US support for Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war as a bulwark against Shi'ite militancy has been well known for some time, but using declassified government documents, the Washington Post provided new details yesterday about Mr Rumsfeld's role, and about the extent of the Reagan administration's knowledge of the use of chemical weapons.

The details will embarrass Mr Rumsfeld, who as defence secretary in the Bush administration is one of the leading hawks on Iraq, frequently denouncing it for its past use of such weapons.

The US provided less conventional military equipment than British or German companies but it did allow the export of biological agents, including anthrax; vital ingredients for chemical weapons; and cluster bombs sold by a CIA front organisation in Chile, the report says.

Intelligence on Iranian troop movements was provided, despite detailed knowledge of Iraq's use of nerve gas.

Rick Francona, an ex-army intelligence lieutenant-colonel who served in the US embassy in Baghdad in 1987 and 1988, told the Guardian: "We believed the Iraqis were using mustard gas all through the war, but that was not as sinister as nerve gas.

"They started using tabun [a nerve gas] as early as '83 or '84, but in a very limited way. They were probably figuring out how to use it. And in '88, they developed sarin."

On November 1 1983, the secretary of state, George Shultz, was passed intelligence reports of "almost daily use of CW [chemical weapons]" by Iraq.

However, 25 days later, Ronald Reagan signed a secret order instructing the administration to do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq losing the war.

In December Mr Rumsfeld, hired by President Reagan to serve as a Middle East troubleshooter, met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and passed on the US willingness to help his regime and restore full diplomatic relations.

Mr Rumsfeld has said that he "cautioned" the Iraqi leader against using banned weapons. But there was no mention of such a warning in state department notes of the meeting.

Howard Teicher, an Iraq specialist in the Reagan White House, testified in a 1995 affidavit that the then CIA director, William Casey, used a Chilean firm, Cardoen, to send cluster bombs to use against Iran's "human wave" attacks.

A 1994 congressional inquiry also found that dozens of biological agents, including various strains of anthrax, had been shipped to Iraq by US companies, under licence from the commerce department.

Furthermore, in 1988, the Dow Chemical company sold $1.5m-worth (930,000) of pesticides to Iraq despite suspicions they would be used for chemical warfare.

The only occasion that Iraq's use of banned weapons seems to have worried the Reagan administration came in 1988, after Lt Col Francona toured the battlefield on the al-Faw peninsula in southern Iraq and reported signs of sarin gas.

"When I was walking around I saw atropine injectors lying around. We saw decontamination fluid on vehicles, there were no insects," said Mr Francona, who has written a book on shifting US policy to Iraq titled Ally to Adversary. "There was a very quick response from Washington saying, 'Let's stop our cooperation' but it didn't last long - just weeks."

Special report
Iraq

Also on Guardian Unlimited
Special report: United States
Special report: Israel & the Middle East
Special report: oil and petrol
More on UK foreign policy

Interactive guides
Iraq's military capability
Presidential 'palaces'
Iraq under threat - the US options
US military buildup
The Gulf war

Explained
09.12.2002: Weapons inspections
04.10.2002: War with Iraq

The weblog
Weblog special: Iraq

News guide
Iraq

Full text
20.12.2002: US secretary of state Colin Powell's statement on Iraq's weapons declaration
20.12.2002: UN security council resolution 1441 on Iraq
02.12.02: UK government dossier on human rights abuses in Iraq (pdf)
24.09.02: UK government dossier on Iraq's military capability (pdf)

In pictures
Saddam Hussein's inner circle
10 years after the Gulf war

Useful links
Arab Gateway: Iraq briefing
Middle East Daily
Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq
Iraq sanctions - UN security council
UN special commission on Iraq




Printable version | Send it to a friend | Read it later | See saved stories





UP

Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003