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A guerrilla armed
force always involves implicit terror ... However, if the terror does
not become explicit, positive results can be expected.
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In the early 1980s, Nicaragua faced constant guerrilla warfare
between the leftist Sandinista government and the Contra rebels. The
U.S. government -- in its fight to stop the spread of communism in the
Western Hemisphere -- secretly supported the Contra guerrillas with
weapons and training.
The following document contains excerpts of an instruction manual
provided by the CIA for guerrilla fighters. It includes detailed
methods of gaining support through propaganda and selective violence.
CIA Manual: Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare
by "Tayn"
Guerrilla warfare is essentially
a political war. Therefore, its area of operations exceeds the
territorial limits of conventional warfare, to penetrate the political
entity itself: the "political animal" that Aristotle defined.
In effect, the human being should
be considered the priority objective in a political war. And conceived
as the military target of guerrilla war, the human being has his most
critical point in his mind. Once his mind has been reached, the
"political animal" has been defeated, without necessarily receiving
bullets.
Guerrilla warfare is born and
grows in the political environment; in the constant combat to dominate
that area of political mentality that is inherent to all human beings
and which collectively constitutes the "environment" in which guerrilla
warfare moves, and which is where precisely its victory or failure is
defined.
This conception of guerrilla
warfare as political war turns Psychological Operations into the
decisive factor of the results. The target, then, is the minds of the
population, all the population: our troops, the enemy troops and the
civilian population.
This book is a manual for the
training of guerrillas in psychological operations, and its application
to the concrete case of the Christian and democratic crusade being
waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.
Welcome!
GENERALITIES
The purpose of this book is to
introduce the guerrilla student to the psychological operations
techniques that will be of immediate and practical value to him in
guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and general; subsequent
sections will cover each point set forth here in more detail.
The nature of the environment of
guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated psychological
operations, and it becomes necessary for the chiefs of groups, chiefs
of detachments and squadron leaders to have the ability to carry out,
with minimal instructions from the higher levels, psychological action
operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware of the
situation, i.e. the foundations.
Combatant, Propagandist Guerrillas
In order to obtain the maximum
results from the psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, every
combatant should be as highly motivated to carry out propaganda face to
face as he is as a combatant. This means that the individual political
awareness of the guerrilla of the reason for his struggle will be as
acute as his ability to fight.
Such a political awareness and
motivation is obtained through the dynamic of groups and
self-criticism, as a standard method of instruction for the guerrilla
training and operations. Group discussions raise the spirit and improve
the unity of thought of the guerrilla squads and exercise social
pressure on the weak members to carry out a better role in future
training or in combative action. Self-criticism is in terms of one's
contribution or defects in his contribution to the cause, to the
movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a positive individual
commitment to the mission of the group.
The desired result is a guerrilla
who can persuasively justify his actions when he comes into contact
with any member of the People of Nicaragua, and especially with himself
and his fellow guerrillas in dealing with the vicissitudes of guerrilla
warfare. This means that every guerrilla will be persuasive in his
face-to-face communication - propagandist - combatant - in his contact
with the people; he should be able to give 5 or 10 logical reasons why,
for example, a peasant should give him cloth, needle and thread to mend
his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this manner, enemy
propaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the eyes of the
people. It also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will
have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to
his constant orientation.
Armed Propaganda
Armed propaganda includes every
act carried out, and the good impression that this armed force causes
will result in positive attitudes in the population toward that force;
and it does not include forced indoctrination. Armed propaganda
improves the behavior of the population toward them, and it is not
achieved by force.
This means that a guerrilla armed
unit in a rural town will not give the impression that arms are their
strength over the peasants, but rather that they are the strength of
the peasants against the Sandinista government of repression. This is
achieved through a close identification with the people, as follows:
hanging up weapons and working together with them on their crops, in
construction, in the harvesting of grains, in fishing, etc.;
explanations to young men about basic weapons, e.g. giving them an
unloaded weapon and letting them touch it, see it, etc.; describing in
a rudimentary manner its operation; describing with simple slogans how
weapons will serve the people to win their freedom; demanding the
requests by the people for hospitals and education, reducing taxes,
etc.
All these acts have as their goal
the creation of an identification of the people with the weapons and
the guerrillas who carry them, so that the population feels that the
weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect them and help them in
the struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit terror always
accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware" that they
can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is avoided,
positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of
armed guerrillas within the population.
Armed Propaganda Teams
Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are
formed through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated
guerrillas who move about within the population, encouraging the people
to support the guerrillas and put up resistance against the enemy. It
combines a high degree of political awareness and the "armed"
propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned, programmed, and
controlled effort.
The careful selection of the
staff, based on their persuasiveness in informal discussions and their
ability in combat, is more important than their degree of education or
the training program. The tactics of the Armed Propaganda Teams are
carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the tactical effort in
guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the population is
primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more intelligence data
will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of operations.
Development and Control of the 'Front' Organizations
The development and control of
"front" (or facade) organizations is carried out through subjective
internal control at group meetings of "inside cadres," and the
calculations of the time for the fusion of these combined efforts to be
applied to the masses.
Established citizens -- doctors,
lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc., -- will be recruited initially as
"Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous" movements in the area of
operations. When their "involvement" with the clandestine organization
is revealed to them, this supplies the psychological pressure to use
them as "inside cadres" in groups to which they already belong or of
which they can be members.
Then they will receive
instruction in techniques of persuasion over control of target groups
to support our democratic revolution, through a gradual and skillful
process. A cell control system isolates individuals from one another,
and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used for the fusion
of groups in a united national front.
Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies
The control of mass meetings in
support of guerrilla warfare is carried out internally through a covert
commando element, bodyguards, messengers, shock forces (initiators of
incidents), placard carriers (also used for making signals), shouters
of slogans, everything under the control of the outside commando
element.
When the cadres are placed or
recruited in organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, agrarian
organizations or professional associations, they will begin to
manipulate the objectives of the groups. The psychological apparatus of
our movement through inside cadres prepares a mental attitude which at
the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of justified violence.
Through a small group of
guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this can be carried out; they
will have the mission of agitating by giving the impression that there
are many of them and that they have a large popular backing. Using the
tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration can be created
in which 10,000-20,000 persons take part.
Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality
The support of local contacts who
are familiar with the deep reality is achieved through the exploitation
of the social and political weaknesses of the target society, with
propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed propaganda, armed propaganda
teams, cover organizations and mass meetings.
The combatant-propagandist
guerrilla is the result of a continuous program of indoctrination and
motivation. They will have the mission of showing the people how great
and fair our movement is in the eyes of all Nicaraguans and the world.
Identifying themselves with our people, they will increase the sympathy
towards our movement, which will result in greater support of the
population for the freedom commandos, taking away support for the
regime in power.
Armed propaganda will extend this
identification process of the people with the Christian guerrillas,
providing converging points against the Sandinista regime.
The Armed Propaganda Teams
provide a several-stage program of persuasive planning in guerrilla
warfare in all areas of the country. Also, these teams are the "eyes
and ears" of our movement.
The development and control of
the cover organizations in guerrilla warfare will give our movement the
ability to create a "whiplash" effect within the population when the
order for fusion is given. When the infiltration and internal
subjective control have been developed in a manner parallel to other
guerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will literally be able to
shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.
The mass assemblies and meetings
are the culmination of a wide base support among the population, and it
comes about in the later phases of the operation. This is the moment in
which the overthrow can be achieved and our revolution can become an
open one, requiring the close collaboration of the entire population of
the country, and of contacts with their roots in reality.
The tactical effort in guerrilla
warfare is directed at the weaknesses of the enemy and at destroying
their military resistance capacity, and should be parallel to a
psychological effort to weaken and destroy their socio-political
capacity at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than in any other
type of military effort, the psychological activities should be
simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives
desired.
ARMED PROPAGANDA
Implicit and Explicit Terror
A guerrilla armed force always
involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it
aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be used against them. However,
if the terror does not become explicit, positive results can be
expected.
In a revolution, the individual
lives under a constant threat of physical damage. If the government
police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population
will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission
of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should
be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result
in a loss of popular support.
In the words of a leader of the HUK guerrilla movement of the Philippine Islands:
"The population is always
impressed by weapons, not by the terror that they cause, but rather by
a sensation of strength/force. We must appear before the people, giving
them support with our weapons; that will give them the message of the
struggle."
This is then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.
An armed guerrilla force can
occupy an entire town or small city that is neutral or relatively
passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the armed propaganda in an
effective manner, the following should be carried out simultaneously:
- Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to a "public place."
- Cut all the outside lines of communication: cables, radio, messengers.
- Set up ambushes, in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible entry routes.
- Kidnap all officials
or agents of the Sandinista government and replace them in "public
places" with military or civilian persons of trust to our movement; in
addition, carry out the following:
- Establish a public
tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the town or city in
order to gather the population for this event.
- Shame, ridicule and
humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of repression in the
presence of the people and foster popular participation through
guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.
- Reduce the influence
of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out their weaknesses
and taking them out of the town, without damaging them publicly.
- Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by all members of the column, practicing the following:
- Any article taken will be paid for with cash.
- The hospitality
offered by the people will be accepted and this opportunity will be
exploited in order to carry out face-to-face persuasion about the
struggle.
- Courtesy visits
should be made to the prominent persons and those with prestige in the
place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.
- The guerrillas
should instruct the population that with the end of the operative, and
when the Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them, they may reveal
EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out. For example, the
type of weapons they use, how many men arrived, from what direction
they came and in what direction they left, in short, EVERYTHING.
- In addition,
indicate to the population that at meetings or in private discussions
they can give the names of the Sandinista informants, who will be
removed together with the other officials of the government of
repression.
- When a meeting is
held, conclude it with a speech by one of the leaders of guerrilla
political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes explicit references
to:
- The fact that the
"enemies of the people" - the officials or Sandinista agents, must not
be mistreated in spite of their criminal acts, although the guerrilla
force may have suffered casualties, and that this is done due to the
generosity of the Christian guerrillas.
- Give a declaration
of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the population, as well as let
them know that the risks that they will run when the Sandinistas return
are greatly appreciated.
- The fact that the
Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people with taxes, control
of money, grains and all aspects of public life through associations,
which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to resist the
attacks of our guerrilla forces.
- Make the promise to
the people that you will return to ensure that the "leeches" of the
Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder our
guerrillas from integrating with the population.
- A statement repeated
to the population to the effect that they can reveal everything about
this visit of our commandos, because we are not afraid of anything or
anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize that we are
Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua and to
establish a very Nicaraguan government.
Guerrilla Weapons are the Strength of the People over an Illegal Government
The armed propaganda in populated
areas does not give the impression that weapons are the power of the
guerrillas over the people, but rather that the weapons are the
strength of the people against a regime of repression. Whenever it is
necessary to use armed force in an occupation or visit to a town or
village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that they:
- Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to protect them, the people, and not themselves.
- Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations.
- That this action,
although it is not desirable, is necessary because the final objective
of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of
force are not necessary.
- The force of weapons
is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist
when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control.
If, for example, it should be
necessary for one of the advanced posts to have to fire on a citizen
who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are
carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following
is recommended:
- Explain that if that
citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy that is
near the town or city, and they would carry out acts of reprisal such
as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., in this way terrorizing
the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and
hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.
- If a guerrilla fires
at an individual, make the town see that he was an enemy of the people,
and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized as their first
duty the protection of citizens.
- The commando tried
to detain the informant without firing because he, like all Christian
guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Having fired at the Sandinista
informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to
prevent the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent
people.
- Make the population
see that it was the repressive system of the regime that was the cause
of this situation, what really killed the informer, and that the weapon
fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime.
- Make the population
see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the repression, the
corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandos would
not have had to brandish arms against brother Nicaraguans, which goes
against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried to
escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the
population, because he would not have tried to inform the enemy. This
death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in
Nicaragua, which is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.
Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects
It is possible to neutralize
carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, mesta
judges, police and State Security officials, CDS chiefs, etc. For
psychological purposes it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and
it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected,
so that they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate
accusations against the oppressor.
The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:
- The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels toward the target.
- Use rejection of
potential hatred by the majority of the population affected toward the
target, stirring up the population and making them see all the negative
and hostile actions of the individual against the people.
- If the majority of
the people give their support or backing to the target or subject, do
not try to change these sentiments through provocation.
- Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace the target.
The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully, based on:
- Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.
- Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.
- Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other individuals in the area of the target.
- Degree of reprisal predictable by the enemy on the population affected or other individuals in the area of the target.
The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:
- Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it was necessary for the good of the people.
- Explain that
Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and above all, a
justification for the execution of this mission.
- Carefully test the
reaction of the people toward the mission, as well as control this
reaction, making sure that the population's reaction is beneficial
towards the Freedom Commandos.
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